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Abstract 
This paper analyses macroeconomic and financial determinants of bad loans applying a SVAR 
approach to investigate whether excessive loans granted during expansionary phases can explain the 
more than proportional increase in non-performing loans during contractionary periods. The results 
indicate that the effects of a permanent shock to bad loans on the excess of credit are significant and 
persistent for bad loans to firms, but not for bad loans to households or in the case of Cooperative 
Credit Banks, who adopt more efficient lending policies.  
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1. Introduction 
There is a large empirical literature showing the growth rate of loans tends to be positive 
during booms and negative during contractions
2
, with loan losses typically growing more than 
proportionately during the latter
3
. As a result, periods of fast loan growth are followed by periods 
characterised by a sharp deterioration in credit quality. If there is a positive shift in the demand for 
credit, banks can increase lending in two ways, either reducing interest rates or lowering the credit 
screening criteria for new loans. The latter leads to an increase in the number of potential 
borrowers, some of which would have previously been excluded as not sufficiently creditworthy. 
Such borrowers have a higher probability of not being able to repay their debt, which increases the 
overall probability of default. When the economy slows down, the profitability of firms tends to 
fall, and consequently unemployment rises and household disposable income decreases, further 
eroding corporate profits. This generates a vicious circle: the financial position of borrowers (both 
firms and households) worsens and some of them are unable to repay their debt.  
Following Bofondi and Ropele (2011), the present paper analyses macroeconomic and 
financial determinants of bad loans applying a SVAR approach to investigate whether excessive 
loans granted during expansionary phases can explain the more than proportional increase in non-
performing loans during contractionary periods.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the relevant empirical literature, 
Section 3 describes the data and some preliminary statistics, Section 4 discusses the empirical 
results, and Section 5 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2. A brief review of the literature 
The dynamic relationship between macroeconomic factors and the quality of loans has been 
investigated in a large body of literature. One of the first contributions is the study by Keeton and 
Morris (1987), who estimated a simple linear regression to examine the macroeconomic 
determinants of credit losses in a sample of 2,500 US commercial banks in the period 1979-1985. 
They found that a significant proportion of loan losses was due to the particularly poor performance 
of some regions and sectors such as agriculture and energy. 
Gavin and Hausmann (1996) examined how macroeconomic trends contributed to the 
banking crises in Latin America during the '90s. They considered domestic interest rates, expected 
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inflation, disposable income and the growth of bank lending, also taking into account monetary 
policy rules and exchange rate regimes, and concluded that worsening macroeconomic conditions 
are a predictor for banking crises in many countries.  
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) and Hardy and Pazarbaşioğlu (1998) showed that 
bank failures can be attributed to macroeconomic shocks. In particular, the former analysed the 
macroeconomic determinants of banking crises using four different specifications of a multivariate 
logit model for a large sample of developed and developing countries during the period from 1980 
to 1994. Inflation and interest rates were found to be positively correlated with banking crises, 
while the correlation with GDP appeared to be negative. Hardy and Pazarbaşioğlu (1998) focused 
instead on the identification of macroeconomic and financial conditions which are related to a 
stressful situation in the banking sector. They analysed a panel of 38 countries using a multinomial 
logit specification. The main result was that the failures in the banking sector are likely to be linked 
to slow economic growth. 
Gambera (2000) used a VAR methodology to assess the impact of macroeconomic variables 
on bank loans at both national and regional level, using data on US commercial banks. He 
considered variables such as unemployment, income from the agricultural sector, GDP, the number 
of bankruptcy cases and sales of automobiles, and found that all of them, with the exception of car 
sales, are good predictors for the quality of loans. 
Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) investigated the relationship between credit quality as 
measured by the stock of credit provisions, macroeconomic variables and banking. They concluded 
that a reversal of the economic cycle leads to a worsening of bank asset quality. All variables they 
considered significantly affected credit quality. Similar evidence is reported by Arpa et al. (2001), 
who examined banking sector cyclicality with a related approach, and Hoggarth et al. (2005), who 
used quarterly data for the UK during the period 1988-2004 to investigate the relationship between 
credit losses and several macroeconomic variables. 
Baboucek and Jancar (2005) estimated an unrestricted VAR using monthly data from 1993 
to 2006 to quantify the effects of macroeconomic shocks on the quality of the Czech banking sector. 
They used the bad loan to loans ratio as an indicator of credit quality and several macroeconomic 
variables. Having identified the main macroeconomic determinants of that ratio, they carried out 
simulations to measure the vulnerability to macroeconomic shocks of the Czech banking sector.  
Filosa (2007) performed similar stress tests on the Italian banking system using a VAR 
specification including three endogenous variables (the default rate, default loans to loans and net 
interest income) and three exogenous variables (the interest rate, the exchange rate and a linear 
trend). He concluded that the procyclicality of these variables is not a crucial factor for the Italian 
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banking sector. A stress test on monetary conditions highlighted the great exposure to this type of 
shock. 
 A very influential contribution was the study by Bofondi and Ropele (2011), who tested the 
macroeconomic determinants of credit quality measured by adjusted new bad debts. We follow their 
approach in the empirical analysis below.  
 
3. Preliminary data analysis   
3.1 Data description 
Our dataset consists of 17 monthly series (see Table 1 for a complete list) over the sample period 
from June 1998 to June 2012 (169 observations). The data sources are the Data Warehouses of the 
Bank of Italy
4
, Istat (the Italian Office for National Statistics), the European Central Bank and 
Bloomberg. 
The data can be divided into two subsets. The first comprises the banking variables, such as 
loans and bad loans at the national level, including total bad loans and loans (excluding bad loans), 
bad loans and loans (excluding bad loans) to firms, bad loans and loans (excluding bad loans) to 
households of all Italian banks and bad loans and loans (excluded bad loans) only for the subset of 
Italian Cooperative Credit Banks (SOFF_ITA, IMP_ITA, SOFF_FIR_ITA, IMP_FIR_ITA, 
SOFF_HOU_ITA, IMP_HOU_ITA, SOF_BCC, IMP_BCC; see Table 1). All the variables have 
been deflated. 
The second one consists of macroeconomic and financial variables. In particular, following 
Bofondi and Ropele (2011), these have been chosen to represent the following five main categories: 
1) general state of the economy, 2) price stability, 3) cost of debt, 4) financial and real wealth, 5) 
trends affecting the economic situation. 
The indicators for the general situation of the economy are the annual growth rates of the 
industrial production index (IPI_ITA) and of the retail sale index (RET_SALES_ITA) as well as the 
unemployment rate (UNEMR_ITA). A higher index of industrial production indicates an 
improvement in economic activity. It is typically correlated with growth in corporate profitability, 
while a higher retail sale index is normally associated to higher consumption. The unemployment 
rate has a negative relationship with current and prospective household disposable income. The 
expected sign of the relationship with bad loans is negative for industrial production and retail sales 
and positive for the unemployment rate. 
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Price stability is measured by the annual growth index of consumer prices (CPI_ITA). As 
mentioned by Bofondi and Ropele (2011), its relationship with credit quality is not clear. On the 
one hand, it reduces the costs associated with high inflation, such as the opportunity cost of money, 
tax distortions, money illusion, and greater riskiness of financial assets. On the other hand, high 
inflation helps debtors by reducing the real value of their debt. On this point the literature has 
provided conflicting evidence. In particular, Shu (2002) found a negative relationship between 
inflation and bad loans, whilst Rinaldi and Sanchis - Arellano (2006) estimated a positive sign. 
The cost of debt is measured by the short-term interbank 3-month Euribor  rate 
(EURIBOR_3M), while for the long term we have chosen the 10-year interest rate swaps 
(IRS_10Y). The expected effect of an increase of short-and long-term interest rates on bad loans is 
positive, since the higher cost of short and long-term debt worsens the financial situation of debtors. 
At the same time, a decrease in interest rates (a monetary expansion) may follow a cyclical 
downturn. In this case, the expected relationship between bad loans and loans is negative. Again, 
the sign of the relationship with credit quality cannot be established a priori. 
The real and financial wealth indicators are the house price index (yearly rate of change, 
HOUS_PRI_ITA) and the main Italian stock index, the FTSE Mib (FTSE_MIB, yearly rate of 
change). In general, the growth of stock indexes reflects, among other things, an improvement in 
the current and future profitability of listed companies (and indirectly, even of those not listed who 
have economic relations with them) and greater household wealth. An increase in house prices 
improves household wealth, the value of the capital stock of firms and the value of collaterals for 
borrowers. Therefore, both variables should be positively correlated to credit quality (and 
negatively with bad loans). 
Finally, the variable chosen as a proxy for the state of the economy is the slope of the term 
structure of interest rates, namely the difference between the 10-year IRS and the 3-month Euribor 
rate (SLOPE_3M_10Y). A steeper curve can be interpreted as an improvement in the expectations 
on future economic growth. The expected sign of the relationship between this variable and bad 
loans is negative. 
 
3.2 Preliminary statistical analysis  
The credit quality of the Italian banking system is assessed here using monthly data on bad loans 
over the period from June 1998 to June 2012. Bad loans are defined as credit positions related to 
7 
 
customers characterised by a "status of persistent financial instability such that credit recovery 
could be obstructed
5
".  
Figures 1a – 1c show the quarterly rate of change (on an annual basis) of bad loans during 
the period from July 1998 to July 2012. The sample period includes three recessions in Italy 
(defined as periods in which GDP declined for at least two consecutive quarters), namely those of 
June 2001 – December 2002, June 2008 – June 2009 and September 2011 – June 2012 (the first two 
of which were double-dip recessions). In all figures these three recessions correspond to the grey 
areas.  
Figures 2a and 2b show quite clearly the negative relationship between bad loans and total 
loans (both in the full sample with all the banks and in the subset with only the Cooperative Credit 
Banks). When the latter fall (during a recession) the former tend to grow sharply. This negative 
correlation is related to the business cycle, as mentioned before.  In particular, bad loans decreased 
until June 2001 for the banking system as a whole, while they grew at a declining rate for the subset 
of CCBs. During the same period, the growth rate of total loans without bad loans increased slowly 
for all banks and decreased for the Cooperative Credit Banks.  
From June 2001 to December 2002, a recession occurred and bad loans started to grow 
sharply while the rates of change of loans continued to be positive, but declining for banks. There 
was also considerable persistence: bad loans continued to grow until June 2004, i.e. two years after 
the end of the recession, while loans were more stable around a lower (on average) growth rate. For 
the CCBs, however, bad loans grew more gradually up to June 2005, with the exception of an 
abnormal reduction in June 2002 due to a securitisation procedure.  
Between June 2004 and December 2007, bad loans of all banks remained stable (with a 
growth rate between 0 and 5%) while lending grew gradually. In particular, two troughs are quite 
evident in Figure 1d: in June 2001 and between December 2005 and December 2006. The first 
corresponds to the expiry of the deadline for the receipt of tax benefits provided by the Law 
130/99
6
. The second one is related to the increase in the securitisation process that preceded the 
entry of IAS / IFRS (8.585 billion euros of securitisations in 2005 with respect to 335 million in 
2004
7
). Furthermore, during the recessions of 2008 – 2009 and 2011-212, bad loans rose sharply, 
for both the banking system as a whole and the CCBs, while loans decreased rather abruptly for the 
former and more gradually for the latter (consistently with the literature on the anti-cyclicality of 
                                                          
5
 Bank of Italy n. 139/1991:  “status di persistente instabilità patrimoniale e finanziaria idonea a intralciare il recupero 
del credito da parte dell’intermediario”. 
6
 The Bank of Italy Governor Annual Report for 2001. 
7
 The Bank of Italy Governor Annual Report for 2005. 
8 
 
loans of Cooperative Banks
8
). Overall, Figures 2a – 2b offer some preliminary evidence that bad 
loans and loans are inversely related to the economic cycle. 
The main features of the statistical distributions of the series described before are shown in 
Table 2. Figure 3a shows the original series, many of which appear to be non-stationary. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (Dickey and Fuller, 1979), KPSS (Kwiatkowsky – Phillips – Schmidt – 
Shin) and Phillips – Perron (Phillips and Perron, 1988) tests 9 suggest in most cases the presence of 
unit roots, except for year-over-year rate of change of industrial production and the consumer price 
index. Therefore, logarithmic first differences have been taken (see Figure 3b). The series have also 
been standardised to allow comparisons. 
The one-year dynamic cross-correlations between bad loans and loans and the other 
macroeconomic and financial variables are reported in Tables 4a and 4b. The relationship between 
bad loans and loans is negative in most cases and the highest correlation can be observed at lag six, 
as one would expect (see Keeton, 1999). When the economy performs well, banks provide more 
credit and bad loans grow slowly, proportionally less than loans. During downturns, the growth rate 
of loans decreases or becomes negative (credit squeeze), while that of non-performing loans rises 
above its long-term average because of the worsening financial conditions of borrowers. Therefore, 
the estimated negative sign (see the dynamic correlation matrix, Tables 4a and 4b) reflects the 
different direction of causality between the two variables. The interesting issue here is whether the 
increase in lending during periods of buoyant growth is excessive with respect to its 
macroeconomic and financial determinants and whether this is related to a credit tightening, which 
leads to a credit quality lowering and to a more than proportional increase of bad loans when the 
economic cycle reverts. The dynamic correlation analysis does not give a clear answer to this 
question. Therefore, further econometric analysis is carried out in the next section. 
As regards the other macroeconomic and financial variables, the correlation signs between 
bad loans and industrial production, retail sales, consumer price index, housing price index, the 3- 
month Euribor rate, and the 10-year interest rate swap is mainly negative, as expected. The 
unemployment rate and the slope of the term structure are instead positively correlated.   
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4. Empirical results 
4.1 Macroeconomic and financial determinants of bad loans 
Next we follow the approach of Kalirai and Scheicher (2002), Arpa et al. (2001), Shu 
(2002), and Bofondi and Ropele (2011), and run the following single equation regressions: 
- , , -
=1 =1
log  log log
p q
t i t i s j s t j t
i j
soff soff x            (1) 
where α is the intercept, sofft and impt represent respectively bad loans and loans for all Italian 
banks (total bad loans and total loans, bad loans and loans to households and to firms) and for 
Cooperative Credit Banks, xt is the set of macroeconomic and financial variables defined before, ɛt 
is the error term, and p and q are the lag order of the autoregressive component and of other 
regressors respectively.  
The results from regression (1) are shown in the first columns on the left of  Tables 5a – 5d 
together with the adjusted R
2
. Although the autoregressive component is not always statistically 
significant, it is retained to avoid residual autocorrelation. The estimated coefficients for the 
variables related to the state of the economy (industrial production, unemployment and retail sales) 
are statistically significant and have the expected sign. Retail sales growth has a negative effect, but 
is statistically significant only in the equation for total bad loans and bad loans to firms of all banks. 
As highlighted in the empirical literature, macroeconomic shocks affect the ability of borrowers to 
repay debt with a time lag. Specifically, this is 7 – 9 quarters in the case of industrial production (2 
for Cooperative Credit Banks), 9 in the case of unemployment (2 for Cooperative Credit Banks), 
and 2 in the case of retail sales. 
Concerning the price stability variables, a negative sign is estimated for the consumer price 
index in the sample with all banks, and a positive but not statistically significant one in the sample 
with only the Cooperative Credit Banks. The time lag is always 1. As for the cost of debt variables 
(the 3-month Euribor interest rate and the 10-year IRS rate), their coefficients are statistically 
significant (though not in the equation for the CCBs) and negative, the time lag ranging from 1 to 2 
months. The estimated relationship between real and financial wealth and loans is negative as 
expected, with a time lag from about 1 quarter to 1 year. Finally, contrary to what was expected, 
bad loans are positive related to the slope of the interest rate curve.  
The next step is the estimation of equations including all the variables found to be statically 
significant in the first stage, and eliminating those with multicollinearity problems. Equation (1) can 
be rewritten as follows: 
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i j m
soff soff x dummy                (2) 
where ρs is a binary variable (equal to 0 for the macroeconomic and financial variables that are 
insignificant or affected by multicollinearity problems, equal to 1 otherwise) and dummyt is a set of 
dummy variables different for each equation. In particular, dummies were introduced in the bad 
loans equations in May 2001 and December 2005 for the equations with all banks (see Table 5a – 
5c), and in July 2002 for the Cooperative Credit Banks (see Table 5d) in order to model the 
anomalies related to the securitisations already mentioned in Section 3. Other variables fond to be 
statistically significant in the first step are excluded (ρs = 0) on the basis of the Akaike and Schwarz 
information criteria and sign coherence. 
The results presented in the RHS columns of Tables 5a – 5d confirm the statistical 
significance and consistence with economic theory of the estimated coefficients for economic 
growth (in particular those on the unemployment rate and the consumer price index, though not in 
the equation for total bad loans of all banks, while that on the retail sales index has low 
significance), real and financial wealth (that on the housing price only in the equation for bad loans 
to households and that on the FTSE Mib stock exchange index only in the equation for bad loans to 
firms) and cost of debt (the 3-month Euribor rate). The estimates for Cooperative Credit Bank bad 
loans indicate that these are affected by the state of the economy (industrial production, 
unemployment and consumer price index) and financial wealth (FTSE Mib stock exchange index) 
but not by the cost of debt. To sum up, bad loans of all banks are in general mainly affected, with a 
time lag, by the cost of debt, the state of the economy variables and real and financial wealth, while 
those of the Cooperative Credit Banks by economic growth and real wealth. 
The estimated equations (2) presented in Tables 5a – 5d  explain well bad loans, as indicated 
by the adjusted R
2
, with values between 0.7 and 0.85. 
 
4.2 Bad loans surplus during recessions 
Having established the robustness of the econometric specification for bad loans (2), we 
now examine whether (i) there is an excess of bad loans during the contractionary phases of the 
economic cycle and whether (ii) this is a consequence of the excessive credit provided during the 
previous expansionary phases.  
To address (i) we test for the existence of an excess of bad loans during the 2008-2009 and 
2011-2012 periods of turmoil. Here an excess of bad loans (or a bad loan surplus) is defined as a 
level of bad loans greater than that which could be explained only by the deterioration of the 
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macroeconomic situation. The existence of such a surplus during recessions could be related to 
excess lending (due to a bad selection criteria) in the past.  
A good proxy of the bad loan component not explained by its macroeconomic and financial 
determinants is given by the regressions residuals of equation (2). These can be assumed to follow a 
standardised normal distribution. Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of the existence of 
a "bad loan surplus" when the cumulative function of the residuals is persistently above 1.96 
standard errors (equal to 1.96 in the case of a normal distribution), i.e. for at least two months.  
Figures 4a – 4d report the cumulative function of the residuals from equations (2), providing 
support to the existence of a bad loan surplus after the recession of 2008-2009 for total bad loans 
and bad loans to firms, only slightly for the Cooperative Credit Banks, and not in the case of bad 
loans to households of all banks. Point (ii) is examined in the next sub-section using VAR 
techniques. 
 
4.3 Is the bad loan surplus affected by past lending policies? A B–Q SVAR approach 
We test whether the bad loan surplus is a consequence of excessive loans granted in 
previous periods using the Blanchard and Quah (1989) method. This allows us to identify a 
sequence of temporary and permanent shocks from loans to bad loans using a bivariate structural 
VAR (Vector Autoregressive).  
Consider the following moving average (MA) representation of infinite order 
tt LZ )(  (3) 
11 12
0 21 22
log
log
t i i Tti
it i i Pt
soff a a
L
imp a a




     
          
  (4) 
where, as above, sofft and impt are bad loans and loans of all banks respectively, while the 
parameters ɛTt and ɛPt represent permanent and transitory shocks generated at time t. It is assumed 
that the innovations ɛTt and ɛPt are independently distributed with zero mean and constant variance. 
This representation has also been adopted for bad loans to households and to firms of all banks and 
for the sub-sample of the Cooperative Credit Banks. 
11 12
0 21 22
log _
log _
t i i Tti
it i i Pt
sof bcc a a
L
imp bcc a a




     
          
  (5) 
In addition, a restriction is imposed such that temporary shocks ɛTt should not affect bad 
loans in the long term, by defining in equation (5) the cumulative effect of the ɛTt shocks on bad 
loans according to the following condition: 
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0)1(    (6) 
where )0,1(  .  
This implies that the sum of the effects of temporary shocks on bad loans must be equal to 
zero. Moreover, since Δ log impt, Δ log sofft, Δ log soff_bcct and Δ log imp_bcct are stationary and 
the variables sofft and impt, soff_bcct and imp_bcct are not cointegrated in levels (as shown by the 
cointegration tests reported in Table 6), the residuals can be represented in the following 
autoregressive form: 
ttZL 
 )(1  (7) 
It follows that it is possible to estimate a finite order VAR for the equation (7), which 
generates a vector of et innovations with a variance matrix equal to Σ, such that 
 1 ( )  t te L Z   (8) 
where Θ(L) is a polynomial of finite order in the lag operator. It can be shown that the VAR 
residuals are a linear combination of temporary and permanent shocks: 
t tε Ce  (9) 
where C is a (2x2) size matrix. If all four elements of the matrix C are known, it is possible to 
obtain ɛt from the VAR residuals et. However, to identify the elements of the C matrix four 
restrictions are needed, three of which can be obtained by normalising to one the innovations of a 
moving average representation and assuming its orthogonality, i.e. 
CC    (10) 
Substituting (8) into (7) then gives:   
( )D  1  (11) 
where D = [1 – Θ –1(1)]C –1. The fourth restriction can derived using jointly equations (9) and (13):  
0 D  (12) 
Using the restrictions given by (10) and (12) we are able to identify all four elements of the 
C matrix, while the full sequence of temporary and permanent disturbances can be obtained from 
(9). The permanent loan shock can be interpreted as a supply shock, or the loan component not due 
to credit demand, but to an excessive decrease (increase) of credit during persistently positive 
(negative) phases of the business cycle. Similarly, the permanent bad loans shock can be thought of 
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as the bad loan surplus with respect to the economic conditions during the recessions of 2008 – 
2009 and 2011 – 2012 (Figure 4a – 4d).  
As a first step, the lag order for all SVARs is set equal to 6 on the basis of standard 
information criteria. Cointegration tests rule out the existence of cointegration vectors among the 
variables included in the SVARs (see Table 6). Finally, all diagnostic tests confirm that the 
bivariate VARs are correctly specified (see Table 7). 
Figures 5a – 5d display the impulse responses. A permanent shock of 1% to the loan 
residuals (i.e. their component not explained by economic fluctuations) leads to an increase of over 
50% of total bad loans of all Italian banks (Figure 5a) and it takes about 14 (24) months for the 
effects of the shock to fall below 10% (5%). The effect is higher (around 70%) and more persistent 
(36 months to be under the threshold of 10%) for bad loans to firms (Figure 5b), while is not 
significantly different from zero for bad loans to households (Figure 5c). In the case of the 
Cooperative Credit Banks (Figure 5d), the initial effect, always positive, is much lower (34.8%) 
than for all Italian banks, but persistent: it takes 16 (26) months for it to fall below 10% (5%).  
In brief, the impulse response analysis suggests that bad loans have a positive and 
statistically significant effect on bad loans of the Italian banking system (with the exclusion of bad 
loans to households), with high persistence (about two years). This positive and persistent effect 
implies that the bad loan surplus during the recessions of 2008 – 2009 and 2011 – 2012 was 
affected by the lending policies of Italian banks in the previous periods. In other words, in addition 
to the deterioration of economic conditions excessive credit in the years before the recessions also 
played a role. Further, the results for the Cooperative Credit Banks confirm that they can select 
local creditworthy borrowers more accurately (Berger and Udell, 2002), because of peer monitoring 
of members (Stiglitz, 1990) and harder incentives for borrowers to repay funds (Angelini, Di Salvo 
and Ferri 1998; Banerjee et al., 1994; Chaddad and Cook, 2004; Hesse and Čihák, 2007). This is 
confirmed also by the forecast variance decomposition analysis in Figures 6a – 6d. In particular, 
Figure 6a shows that between 30 and 33 percent of the variability of bad loans over a period of 36 
months (3 years) is explained by a permanent shock to loans (between 62 and 54 per cent for loans 
to firms and between 3 and 5 percent for loans to households – see Figure 6b and 6c). On average, 
the variance component of bad loans for the banking system explained by a permanent shock to 
loans over a business cycle is equal to 32.24% (55.71% for loans to firms and 4.80% for loans to 
households). For the Cooperative Credit Banks (Figure 6d), the corresponding percentage is equal, 
on average, to 17.24%. 
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Finally, Granger causality tests (Table 8) provides further empirical confirmation that lagged 
loans contain useful information to predict total bad loans and bad loans to firms of all banks and 
total bad loans of Cooperative Credit Banks.  
   
5. Conclusions 
The empirical literature on the relationship between credit quality in the banking sector and 
macroeconomic cycles has emphasised that the former is affected by negative macroeconomic and 
financial shocks (see Bofondi and Ropele, 2011). On the other hand, it is well known that bank 
loans are pro-cyclical, and therefore loans and credit quality are inversely related to the business 
cycle. Loans increase rapidly in periods of growth and tend to stabilise or even contract during 
recessions. Bad loans, considered as a measure of credit quality, are relatively stable during periods 
of strong economic growth, and then they grow exponentially during recessions. An issue of 
considerable interest is whether, given this inverse relationship with the economic cycle, an excess 
of credit during periods of economic growth can cause an excess of bad loans when the economy 
contracts.  
This paper has aimed to answer this question, first identifying the macroeconomic 
determinants of bad loans and loans, then analysing empirically the existence of an excess of bad 
loans during the recession of 2008-2012 and, finally, testing the effects of a permanent shock to bad 
loans on the excess of credit with a bivariate structural VAR à la Blanchard and Quah (1989). The 
results indicate that, for the banking sector as a whole, these are significant and persistent for bad 
loans to firms but not for bad loans to households.  
Moreover, in the case of Cooperative Credit Banks, that are mostly small local banks 
adopting a relationship banking approach with credit borrowers (Berger and Udell, 2002), there is 
no evidence of such a bad loans surplus. Their lending policies are more efficient than those of 
other banks and do not lead to excessive bad loans during recessions. 
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Figure 1a. Total bad loans of the Italian banking system 
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Note. Total bad loans (logarithmic difference year over year) for the Italian banking 
system from June 1999 to December 2012. The grey areas indicate the Italian 
economic recessions of 2001-2002, 2008-2009 and 2011-2012. Descriptive statistics 
for this variable are provided in Table 2. 
Source (see also Table 1): Bank of Italy.  
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Figure 1b. Total bad loans to firms and to households 
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Note. Total bad loans to firms (logarithmic difference year over year) and to 
households (logarithmic difference year over year)  for the Italian banking system 
from June 1999 to December 2012. The grey areas indicate the Italian economic 
recessions of 2001-2002, 2008-2009 and 2011-2012. Descriptive statistics for this 
variable are provided in Table 2. 
Source (see also Table 1): Bank of Italy.  
 
 
Figure 1c. Total bad loans - All banks and Cooperative Credit Banks 
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Note. Total bad loans (logarithmic difference year over year)  of all banks and only 
Cooperative Credit Banks (BCCs) for Italian banking system from June 1999 to 
December 2012. The grey areas indicate the Italian economic recessions of 2001-
2002, 2008-2009 and 2011-2012. Descriptive statistics for this variable are provided 
in Table 2. 
Source (see also Table 1): Bank of Italy.  
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Figure 2a. Total bad loans and total loans (without bad loans) – All banks 
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Note. Total bad loans (logarithmic difference year over year) and total loans (minus 
bad loans, logarithmic difference year over year) for Italian banking system from 
June 1999 to December 2012. The grey areas indicate the Italian economic 
recessions of 2001-2002, 2008-2009 and 2011-2012. Descriptive statistics for this 
variable are provided in Table 2. 
Source (see also Table 1): Bank of Italy.  
 
Figure 2b. Bad loans and total loans (without bad loans) – Cooperative Credit Banks % ch. y/y 
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Note. Total bad loans (logarithmic difference year over year) and total loans (minus 
bad loans, logarithmic difference year over year) for Italian Cooperative Credit 
Banks from June 1999 to December 2012. The grey areas indicate the Italian 
economic recessions of 2001-2002, 2008-2009 and 2011-2012. Descriptive statistics 
for this variable are provided in Table 2. 
Source (see also Table 1): Bank of Italy.  
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Figure 3a. Raw series  
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Acronyms: SOFF = Total bad loans of Italian banking system (in million euros), IMP = Total loans of Italian banking 
system without bad loans (in million euros), SOFF_BCC = Total bad loans of Cooperative Credit Banks (in million 
euros), IMP_BCC = Total loans of Cooperative Credit Banks (in million euros), IPI_ITA = Italian Industrial Production 
Index rate of change year over year, CPI_ITA = Italian Consumer Price Index rate of change year over year, 
UNEMR_ITA = Italian unemployment rate (in percentage points),  RET_SALES_ITA = Italian Retail Sales Index rate 
of change year over year, HOUS_PRI_ITA = Italian Housing Price Index rate of change year over year, EURIBOR_3M 
= Euribor 3 Month Interest Rate, IRS_10Y = Interest Rate Swap 10 Years, SLOPE_3M_10Y = Difference between 
Interest Rate Swap 10 Years and Euribor 3 Month Interest Rate, FTSE_MIB = FTSE Mib Stock Exchange Index.  
Sources: see Table 1.  
Descriptive Statistics: see Table 2. 
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Figure 3b. Standardised series in logs  
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Acronyms. DL_SOFF_STD = Logarithmic first difference of total bad loans of Italian banking system (in million 
euros), DL_IMP_N_STD = Logarithmic first difference of total loans of Italian banking system without bad loans (in 
million euros), DL_SOFF_BCC_STD = Logarithmic first difference of total bad loans of Cooperative Credit Banks (in 
million euros), DL_IMP_BCC_N_TSD = Logarithmic first difference of total loans of Cooperative Credit Banks (in 
million euros), IPI_ITA = Italian Industrial Production Index rate of change year over year, DL_UNEMR_ITA_STD = 
Logarithmic first difference of Italian unemployment rate (in percentage points),  DL_CPI_ITA_STD = Italian 
Consumer Price Index rate of change year over year, DL_RET_SALES_ITA_STD = Logarithmic first difference of 
Italian Retail Sales Index rate of change year over year, DL_HOUS_PRI_ITA_STD = Logarithmic first difference of 
Italian Housing Price Index rate of change year over year, DL_EURIBOR_3M_STD = Logarithmic first difference of 
Euribor 3 Month Interest Rate, DL_IRS_10Y_STD = Logarithmic first difference of Interest Rate Swap 10 Years, 
DL_SLOPE_3M_10Y_STD = Logarithmic first difference of Interest Rate Swap 10 Years - Euribor 3 Month Interest 
Rate, DL_FTSE_MIB_STD = Logarithmic first difference of FTSE Mib Stock Exchange Index.  
Sources: see Table 1.  
Descriptive Statistics: see Table 2 
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Figure 4a. Surplus of bad loans (Italian Banks) wrt their macroeconomic determinants 
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Note. Bad loan surplus with respect to their macroeconomic fundamentals is the cumulated function of 
residuals for the equation (1), where the dependent variable is total bad loans for Italian banking system 
regressed on its macroeconomic and financial determinants. Under the assumption of normality in the 
residuals, the existence of a bad loan surplus is considered statistically significant when the cumulated 
function of residuals is persistently (at least two months) above 1.96. 
 
Figure 4b. Surplus of bad loans to firms (Italian Banks) wrt their macroeconomic determinants 
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Note. Surplus of  bad loans to firms with respect to their macroeconomic fundamentals is the cumulated 
function of residuals for the equation (1), where the dependent variable is total bad loans for Italian 
banking system regressed on its macroeconomic and financial determinants. Under the assumption of 
normality in the residuals, the existence of a bad loan surplus is considered statistically significant when 
the cumulated function of residuals is persistently (at least two months) above 1.96. 
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Figure 4c. Surplus of bad loans to households (Italian Banks) wrt their macroeconomic determinants 
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Note. Surplus of bad loans to households with respect to their macroeconomic fundamentals is the 
cumulated function of residuals for the equation (1), where the dependent variable is total bad loans for 
Italian banking system regressed on its macroeconomic and financial determinants. Under the assumption 
of normality in the residuals, the existence of a bad loan surplus is considered statistically significant 
when the cumulated function of residuals is persistently (at least two months) above 1.96. 
 
Figure 4d. Surplus of bad loans (Italian Cooperative Credit Banks) wrt their macroeconomic determinants 
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Note. Surplus of Cooperative Credit Bank bad loans with respect to their macroeconomic fundamentals is 
the cumulated function of residuals for the equation (1), where the dependent variable is total bad loans 
for Italian banking system regressed on its macroeconomic and financial determinants. Under the 
assumption of normality in the residuals, the existence of a bad loan surplus is considered statistically 
significant when the cumulated function of residuals is persistently (at least two months) above 1.96. 
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Figure 5a. Impulse Response Analysis from total loans to total bad loans of all banks 
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Note. Impulse response analysis on the basis of (3) – (12) B–Q SVAR estimations. 
The impulse in this figure is from total loans residuals to total bad loans of all 
Italian banks. 
 
Figure 5b. Impulse Response Analysis from loans to firms to bad loans to firms of all banks 
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Note. Impulse response analysis on the basis of (3) – (12) B–Q SVAR estimations. 
The impulse in this figure is from loans to firms residuals to bad loans to firms of 
all Italian banks. 
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Figure 5c. Impulse Response Analysis from loans to households to bad loans to households of all banks 
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Note. Impulse response analysis on the basis of (3) – (12) B–Q SVAR 
estimations.The iImpulse in this figure is from loans to households residuals to bad 
loans to households of all Italian banks. 
 
Figure 5d. Impulse Response Analysis from total loans to total bad loans of  Cooperative Credit Banks 
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Note. Impulse response analysis on the basis of (3) – (12) B–Q SVAR estimations. 
The impulse in this figure is from total loans residuals to total bad loans of Italian 
Cooperative Credit Banks. 
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Figure 6a. Variance decomposition (total loans to total bad loans of all banks) 
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Note. Variance decomposition analysis on the basis of (3) – (12) B–Q SVAR 
estimations showing the percentage of variance of total bad loans explained by 
total loans of all Italian banks. 
 
 
Figure 6b. Variance decomposition (loans to firms to  bad loans to firms of all banks) 
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Note. Variance decomposition analysis on the basis of (3) – (12) B–Q SVAR 
estimations showing the percentage of variance of bad loans to firms explained by 
loans to firms of all Italian banks. 
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Figure 6c. Variance decomposition (loans to households to bad loans to households of all banks) 
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Note. Variance decomposition analysis on the basis of (3) – (12) B–Q SVAR 
estimations showing the percentage of variance of bad loans to households 
explained by loans to households of all Italian banks. 
 
 
Figure 6d. Variance decomposition (total loans to total bad loans of Cooperative Credit Banks) 
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Note. Variance decomposition analysis on the basis of (3) – (12) B–Q SVAR 
estimations showing the percentage of variance of total bad loans explained by 
total loans of all Italian banks. 
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Table 1. List of variables 
Variables Name Source Units # observ. Freq. 
Total Bad loans SOFF_ITA Bank of Italy mln. euros 169 monthly 
Total Loans IMP_ITA Bank of Italy mln. euros 169 monthly 
Total Bad loans to firms SOFF_FIR_ITA Bank of Italy mln. euros 169 monthly 
Total Loans to firms IMP_FIR_ITA Bank of Italy mln. euros 169 monthly 
Total Bad loans to households SOFF_HOU_ITA Bank of Italy mln. euros 169 monthly 
Total Loans to households IMP_HOU_ITA Bank of Italy mln. euros 169 monthly 
Total Bad loans (BCC) SOFF_BCC_ITA Bank of Italy mln. euros 169 monthly 
Total Loans (BCC) IMP_BCC_ITA Bank of Italy mln. euros 169 monthly 
Industrial Production IPI_ITA Istat (% ch. y/y) 169 monthly 
Unemployment rate UNEMR_ITA Istat % 169 monthly 
CPI CPI_ITA Istat (% ch. y/y) 169 monthly 
Retail sales RET_SALES_ITA Istat (% ch. y/y) 169 monthly 
Housing Price Index HOUS_PRI_ITA Bloomberg (% ch. y/y) 169 monthly 
Euribor interest rate (3 months) EURIBOR_3M ECB % 169 monthly 
IRS 10 years IRS_10Y Bloomberg % 169 monthly 
Interest rate slope (3M – 10Y) SLOPE_3M_10Y - % 169 monthly 
FTSE MIB Index FTSE_MIB Bloomberg Index 169 monthly 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
  Mean Median Maximum Minimum 
Standard 
deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis # Observ. 
Bad Loans 57873.94  51827.04 113078 39582.71 17229.19 1.812214 5.426497 169 
Bad Loans to Firms 35535.97 31637.54 75195.9 24931.07 12147.25 1.891203 5.608524 169 
Bad Loans to Households 12848.39 11263.59 25851.54 8629.95 4139.452 2.028945 6.016291 169 
Bad loans BCC 2966.966 2262.478 7826.142 1637.143 1605.496 1.55077 4.210696 169 
Loans 1315124 1207437 1983974 716373.3 415291 0.300645 1.645879 169 
Loans to Firms 655258.8 629117 914848 383188.5 173802 0.051176 1.553201 169 
Loans to Households 295621.3 287195.3 507196.8 122342.8 116115.7 0.341897 1.978053 169 
Loans BCC 79644.53 77818.2 132905.7 28301.84 34547.5 0.109294 1.610684 169 
Industrial Production  -0.0091 0.001 0.114 -0.259 0.064794 -1.65365 6.762785 169 
Unemployment 0.084831 0.083 0.114 0.0605 0.014767 0.382177 2.355258 169 
CPI 0.022988 0.023 0.042 -0.001 0.00755 -0.1324 3.803218 169 
Retail Sales 0.00472 0.007 0.1744 -0.068 0.026972 1.310953 13.36258 138 
Housing Pricing 0.07087 0.073 0.198 -0.05 0.075945 0.125468 1.631214 169 
Euribor 3 Months 0.027709 0.02669 0.05277 0.006431 0.013319 0.092036 1.920596 163 
IRS 10 years 0.041897 0.042184 0.0595 0.01678 0.009503 -0.15382 2.550469 162 
Interest rate slope 0.014218 0.014633 0.02883 -0.00606 0.00809 -0.3767 2.41511 162 
FTSE Mib Index 30233.18 30903 48479 12873.84 8877.925 0.045477 2.042134 169 
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Table 3. Unit root analysis 
 
 
Levels First differences 
 
 
ADF KPSS PP ADF KPSS PP 
Bad Loans  1.401802 0.297041 1.204577 -10.61439 0.977093 -11.51323 
Bad Loans to Firms  1.474598 0.295898 1.192701 -10.50626 1.009808 -11.39100 
Bad Loans to Households  1.386049 0.292947 1.248764 -11.11880 0.888709 -11.72823 
Bad loans BCC  1.727974 0.365565 5.371583 -0.841602 1.340487 -12.19988 
Gross Loans  -1.822335 0.292393 -1.837794 -12.37217 0.173698 -12.37217 
Net Loans   -1.583733 0.239620 -1.627998 -12.18950 0.153040 -12.19017 
Gross Loans to Firms  -0.635990 0.142604 -0.933627 -13.12600 0.226555 -13.23297 
Net Loans to Firms  -2.014944 0.145170 0.123295 -1.546378 0.374338 -12.42516 
Gross Loans to Households  -1.817074 0.228654 -1.939892 -11.81626 0.161839 -11.80515 
Net Loans to Households  -2.088829 0.202939 -2.226279 -11.89827 0.102464 -11.88655 
Gross Loans BCC  -1.043042 0.242339 -1.185160 -5.811215 0.304718 -15.84326 
Net Loans BCC  -1.758857 0.296466 -2.054487 -6.114972 0.442484 -16.29628 
Industrial Production   -4.130284 0.043998 -3.388272 - - - 
Unemployment  0.268942 0.359115 1.446915 -3.400715 0.831669 -12.38598 
CPI  -2.293292 0.069867 -2.480641 -11.97279 0.063459 -11.95257 
Retail Sales  -8.969387 0.080123 -8.957823 - - - 
Housing Price Index  -1.904995 0.203017 -1.603802 -5.823740 0.120458 -5.823740 
Euribor 3 Months  -2.168552 0.110482 -1.964922 -6.457750 0.094856 -6.500350 
IRS 10 years  -2.687605 0.107449 -2.998832 -10.44627 0.221301 -10.42250 
Interest rate slope  -2.329905 0.110526 -2.434446 -9.572045 0.056039 -9.517479 
FTSE Mib Index  -1.735073 0.133367 -1.910261 -12.75286 0.133133 -12.80477 
Critical value (1%)  -4.013608 0.216000 -4.013608 -3.469691 0.739000 -3.469691 
Critical value (5%)  -3.436795 0.146000 -3.436795 -2.878723 0.463000 -2.878723 
Critical value (10%)  -3.142546 0.119000 -3.142546 -2.576010 0.347000 -2.576010 
Acronyms. ADF = Augmented Dickey Fuller test statistics; KPSS = Kwiatkoswky – Phillips – Schmidt – Shin test statistics; PP = Phillips – Perron statistic test. 
The unit root tests for the levels are with an intercept and a trend. Those for the first difference are with a trend only. 
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Table 4a. Dynamic cross-correlations (I) 
 Bad loans (all banks) 
  t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8 t+9 t+10 t+11 t+12 
Loans -0.09 -0.11 -0.05 0.01 -0.06 -0.09 -0.15 -0.07 0.07 0.01 -0.08 -0.07 -0.09 
Industrial Production -0.15 -0.13 -0.16 -0.16 -0.20 -0.18 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.18 -0.13 -0.13 -0.20 
Unemployment rate 0.12 0.02 0.11 0.23 0.03 0.07 0.18 -0.03 0.07 0.23 0.06 0.11 0.17 
Consumer Price Index -0.22 -0.25 -0.21 -0.14 -0.16 -0.14 -0.12 -0.10 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 
Retail sales -0.15 -0.03 -0.18 -0.18 -0.45 -0.12 -0.09 0.01 0.02 -0.18 -0.03 -0.07 -0.08 
House price index -0.24 -0.24 -0.24 -0.24 -0.23 -0.22 -0.22 -0.21 -0.21 -0.20 -0.20 -0.20 -0.19 
Euribor 3M interest rate -0.40 -0.41 -0.38 -0.36 -0.34 -0.31 -0.29 -0.28 -0.25 -0.22 -0.19 -0.18 -0.15 
Irs rate 10Y -0.30 -0.31 -0.29 -0.29 -0.29 -0.29 -0.25 -0.25 -0.23 -0.22 -0.22 -0.20 -0.18 
Interest rate slope  0.31 0.32 0.28 0.25 0.22 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.14 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.04 
 Bad loans to firms (all banks) 
 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8 t+9 t+10 t+11 t+12 
Loans -0.09 -0.28 -0.15 -0.03 0.02 -0.22 -0.35 -0.07 -0.02 -0.10 -0.08 -0.21 -0.16 
Industrial Production -0.17 -0.15 -0.19 -0.18 -0.21 -0.19 -0.17 -0.18 -0.16 -0.18 -0.13 -0.13 -0.19 
Unemployment rate 0.11 0.02 0.12 0.23 0.03 0.08 0.17 -0.02 0.09 0.23 0.06 0.11 0.17 
Consumer Price Index -0.22 -0.24 -0.19 -0.12 -0.14 -0.12 -0.09 -0.07 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.04 
Retail sales -0.15 -0.06 -0.21 -0.18 -0.44 -0.11 -0.09 0.01 0.02 -0.16 -0.03 -0.06 -0.06 
House price index -0.23 -0.23 -0.23 -0.23 -0.22 -0.21 -0.20 -0.20 -0.19 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.17 
Euribor 3M interest rate -0.41 -0.41 -0.38 -0.36 -0.34 -0.31 -0.29 -0.27 -0.24 -0.21 -0.18 -0.16 -0.14 
Irs rate 10Y -0.31 -0.31 -0.30 -0.29 -0.29 -0.29 -0.26 -0.26 -0.24 -0.22 -0.22 -0.20 -0.18 
Interest rate slope  0.31 0.32 0.28 0.25 0.22 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.01 
Note. All variables (with the exception of  the industrial production and retail sales indices) are in logarithmic differences and have been standardized. 
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Table 4b. Dynamic cross-correlations (II) 
 Bad loans to households (all banks) 
  t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8 t+9 t+10 t+11 t+12 
Loans 0.15 -0.01 -0.06 0.01 0.06 0.02 -0.09 0.34 0.01 -0.05 -0.04 -0.10 -0.06 
Industrial Production -0.10 -0.06 -0.09 -0.10 -0.16 -0.13 -0.12 -0.13 -0.16 -0.18 -0.14 -0.14 -0.21 
Unemployment rate 0.12 0.03 0.06 0.22 0.01 0.02 0.19 -0.04 0.03 0.22 0.06 0.09 0.16 
Consumer Price Index -0.24 -0.28 -0.24 -0.19 -0.21 -0.19 -0.16 -0.16 -0.12 -0.12 -0.10 -0.07 -0.05 
Retail sales -0.14 -0.02 -0.10 -0.16 -0.38 -0.11 -0.07 -0.02 -0.01 -0.19 -0.04 -0.09 -0.11 
House price index -0.24 -0.24 -0.25 -0.25 -0.24 -0.24 -0.24 -0.24 -0.24 -0.23 -0.23 -0.23 -0.22 
Euribor 3M interest rate -0.37 -0.38 -0.36 -0.33 -0.32 -0.30 -0.29 -0.28 -0.26 -0.24 -0.21 -0.20 -0.18 
Irs rate 10Y -0.28 -0.28 -0.27 -0.26 -0.27 -0.26 -0.22 -0.22 -0.21 -0.20 -0.21 -0.19 -0.17 
Interest rate slope  0.28 0.30 0.27 0.24 0.21 0.18 0.21 0.20 0.18 0.14 0.10 0.11 0.09 
 Bad loans to firms (Cooperative Credit Banks) 
 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8 t+9 t+10 t+11 t+12 
Loans 0.10 -0.11 -0.33 0.10 -0.18 -0.10 -0.04 -0.12 -0.20 0.01 -0.08 -0.05 0.03 
Industrial Production -0.20 -0.18 -0.21 -0.16 -0.18 -0.16 -0.15 -0.12 -0.11 -0.14 -0.12 -0.11 -0.14 
Unemployment rate 0.07 0.16 0.20 0.07 0.23 0.19 0.10 0.12 0.16 0.18 0.08 0.15 0.15 
Consumer Price Index -0.07 -0.06 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.08 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.02 
Retail sales -0.23 -0.22 -0.18 -0.19 -0.26 -0.20 -0.17 -0.22 -0.12 -0.22 -0.10 -0.15 -0.10 
House price index -0.32 -0.31 -0.31 -0.31 -0.31 -0.29 -0.31 -0.30 -0.30 -0.29 -0.29 -0.29 -0.29 
Euribor 3M interest rate -0.29 -0.28 -0.26 -0.24 -0.22 -0.20 -0.18 -0.15 -0.14 -0.13 -0.12 -0.13 -0.12 
Irs rate 10Y -0.34 -0.35 -0.33 -0.33 -0.32 -0.28 -0.26 -0.26 -0.22 -0.21 -0.22 -0.20 -0.19 
Interest rate slope  0.10 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 
Note. All variables (with the exception of  the industrial production and retail sales indices) are in logarithmic differences and have been standardized. 
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Table 5a. Regression results 
 
Dependent Variable: Bad loans  
Regressors 
Equation (1) Equation (2) 
Coeff.  Adj. R
2
 Coeff.   
Intercept -  - 0.010 ***  
Bad loans (t-1) -  - 0.021   
Bad loans (t-7) -  - 0.137 ***  
Industrial production (-7) -0.203 *** 0.634 -   
Unemployment (-9) 0.197 *** 0.630 0.084 *  
Consumer price index (-1) -0.202 *** 0.625 -   
Retail sales (-2) -0.141 *** 0.682 -   
House pricing index (-3) -0.145 *** 0.607 -   
Euribor 3M (-1) -0.379 *** 0.696 -0.810 **  
Euribor 3M (-2) -0.364 *** 0.685 0.475 *  
IRS 10Y (-1) -0.265 *** 0.651 -   
Interest rate term structure slope (-1) 0.223 *** 0.637 -   
FTSE Mib (-12) -0.145 *** 0.618 -   
Dummy 2001M05 -  - -4.949 ***  
Dummy 2005M12 -  - -6.356 ***  
Dummy 2011M01 -  - -4.568 ***  
Adjusted R
2
 -  - 0.702   
DW -  - 2.047   
LM test - F(12, 133) -  - 1.288   
# observations -  - 159   
Note. The estimated regressions are equations (1) and (2). The dependent variable is total bad 
loans of all Italian banks. All variables (with the exception of  industrial production index and 
retail sales index are in logarithmic differences) and have been standardized. *: significant at 
the 10% level, **: significant at the 5% level, ***: significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 5b. Regression results 
 
Dependent Variable: Bad loans to firms  
Regressors 
Equation (1) Equation (2) 
Coeff.  Adj. R
2
 Coeff.  
Intercept -  - 1.291 *** 
Bad Loans to Firms (t-1) -  - -0.092 * 
Bad Loans to Firms (t-2) -  - -0.025  
Industrial production (-7) -0.207 *** 0.601 -  
Unemployment (-9) 0.199 *** 0.597 0.099 ** 
Consumer price index (-1) -0.183 *** 0.579 -0.174 *** 
Retail sales (-2) -0.170 *** 0.662 -0.082 * 
House pricing index (-1) -0.134 ** 0.565 -  
Euribor 3M (-1) -0.382 *** 0.663 -0.221 *** 
Euribor 3M (-2) -0.363 *** 0.650 -  
IRS 10Y (-1) -0.262 *** 0.616 -  
Interest rate term structure slope (-1) 0.225 *** 0.603 -  
FTSE Mib (-12) -0.120 ** 0.562 -0.084 * 
Dummy 2001M5 -  - -5.222 *** 
Dummy 2005M12 -  - -6.019 *** 
Dummy 2011M01 -  - -4.121 *** 
Adjusted R
2
 -  - 0.754  
DW -  - 2.172  
LM test – F(12, 113) -  - 0.136  
# observations -  - 136  
Note. The estimated regressions are equations (1) and (2). The dependent variable is bad 
loans to firms of all Italian banks. All variables (with the exception of  industrial production 
index and retail sales index are in logarithmic differences) and have been standardized. *: 
significant at the 10% level, **: significant at the 5% level, ***: significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 5c. Regression results  
 
 
Dependent Variable: Bad loans to to Households  
Regressors 
Equation (1) Equation (2) 
Coeff.  Adj. R
2
 Coeff.   
Intercept -  - 0.975 ***  
Bad Loans to Hosueholds (t-1) -  - -2.484   
Bad Loans to Hosueholds (t-2) -  - 0.595   
Industrial production (-9) -0.174 *** 0.801 -   
Unemployment (-9) 0.154 *** 0.794 0.066 *  
Consumer price index (-1) -0.167 *** 0.791 -0.120 ***  
Retail sales (-2) -0.132 * 0.721 -   
House pricing index (-8) -0.167 *** 0.798 -0.130 ***  
Euribor 3M (-1) -0.219 *** 0.803 -0.888 ***  
Euribor 3M (-2) -0.198 *** 0.796 0.766 ***  
IRS 10Y (-1) -0.163 *** 0.792 -   
Interest rate term structure slope (-1) 0.111 ** 0.781 -   
FTSE Mib (-12) -0.098 ** 0.777 -   
Dummy 1999M12 -  - -2.818 ***  
Dummy 2000M12 -  - -2.171 ***  
Dummy 2001M05 -  - -4.620 ***  
Dummy 2005M12 -  - -5.120 ***  
Dummy 2008M04 -  - -1.614 ***  
Dummy 2008M12 -  - -4.196 ***  
Dummy 2011M01 -  - -5.786 ***  
Adjusted R
2
 -  - 0.849   
DW -  - 2.164   
LM test - F(12, 132) -  - 0.496   
# observations -  - 159   
Note. The estimated regressions are equations (1) and (2). The dependent variable is bad loans 
to households of all Italian banks. All variables (with the exception of  industrial production 
index and retail sales index are in logarithmic differences) and have been standardized. *: 
significant at the 10% level, **: significant at the 5% level, ***: significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 5d. Regression results  
 
 
Dependent Variable: Bad loans Cooperative Credit Banks (BCC) 
Regressors 
Equation (1) Equation (2) 
Coeff.  Adj. R2 Coeff.  
Intercept -  - 0.584 *** 
Bad loans CCB (t-1) -  - -0.003  
Bad loans CCB (t-2) -  - 0.014  
Industrial production (-2) -0.119 *** 0.747 -0.096 ** 
Unemployment (-2) 0.134 *** 0.742 0.076 * 
Consumer price index (-1) 0.011  0.719 -0.165 *** 
Retail sales (-2) -0.101  0.727 -  
House pricing index (-4) -0.185 *** 0.754 -  
Euribor 3M (-1) -0.203 * 0.729 -  
Euribor 3M (-2) -0.175  0.712 -  
IRS 10Y (-1) -0.151  0.708 -  
Interest rate term structure slope (-1) 0.126  0.711 -  
FTSE Mib (-12) -0.142 *** 0.748 -0.122 *** 
Dummy 1998M11 -  - -2.583 *** 
Dummy 1998M12 -  - -3.037 *** 
Dummy 2002M07 -  - -8.749 *** 
Dummy 2009M12 -  - -2.278 *** 
Dummy 2010M07 -  - 2.057 *** 
- -  - -  
- -  - -  
Adjusted R
2
 -  - 0.785  
DW -  - 1.881  
LM test – F(12, 139) -  - 2.208  
# observations -  - 136  
Note. The estimated egressions are equations (1) and (2). The dependent variable is total 
bad loans of Italian Cooperative Credit Banks. All variables (with the exception of  
industrial production index and retail sales index are in logarithmic differences) and have 
been standardized. *: significant at the 10% level, **: significant at the 5% level, ***: 
significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 6. Cointegration tests 
 
Cointegration vectors Rank Eigenvalue Trace test Maximum eigenvalue test 
 p-r r  Statistic CV at 95% Statistic vc al 95% 
TBL / L ALL 
2 0 0.064884 11.58854 15.49471 10.86766 14.26460 
1 1 0.004440 0.720881 3.841466 0.720881 3.841466 
BLF / LF ALL 
2 0 0.063991 10.70131 15.49471 10.18398 14.26460  
1 1 0.003354 0.517333 3.841466 0.517333 3.841466 
BLH / LH ALL 
2 0 0.042332 9.314032 15.49471  7.007119 14.26460 
1 1 0.014139 2.306913 3.841466 2.306913 3.841466 
TBL / L CCB 
2 0 0.053790 10.27505 15.49471 8.957105 14.26460 
1 1 0.008102 1.317945 3.841466 1.317945 3.841466 
Acronyms. TBL / L ALL = Cointegration is tested for Total Bad Loans and total Loans of all Italian banks, BLF / LF 
ALL = Cointegration is tested for Bad Loans to Firms and total Loans to Firms of all Italian banks, BLH / LH ALL = 
Cointegration is tested for Bad Loans to Households and total Loans to Households of all Italian banks, TBL / L CCB = 
Cointegration is tested for Total Bad Loans and total Loans of  Italian Cooperative Credit Banks.  
Note. P is the VAR lag order, r is the cointegration rank. 
 
 
 
Table 7. Diagnostic Tests for Bi-variate VAR 
 
 TBL ALL BLF BLH TLB CCB 
  p-value  p-value  p-value  p-value 
Autocorrelation LM AR(t-6) 4.0829 [0.3949] 8.1952 [0.0847] 3.8370 [0.4285] 8.36552 [0.0791] 
Autocorrelation Portmanteau 7.3379 [0.1191] 10.3044 [0.0629] 9.2134 [0.0712] 5.79369 [0.2151] 
Normality (JB) 18391.1 [0.0000] 1305.3 [0.0000] 36618.5 [0.0000] 31756.5 [0.0000] 
Heteroschedasticity 196.02 [0.9998] 239.563 [0.2901] 208.947 [0.9977] 257.252 [0.7015] 
Acronyms. TBL ALL = Total Bad Loans of all Italian banks, BLF = Bad Loans to Firms of all Italian banks, BLF = Bad 
Loans to Households of all Italian banks, TBL CCB = Total Bad Loans of Italian Cooperative Credit Banks. 
Note. Testsof uncorrect specification are referred to B-Q SVAR estimations under (3) – (12). P-value under brackets. 
 
 
 
Table 8. Pairwise Granger causality tests 
 
 Caused by Chi-sq p-value lags # obs. 
Total Loans – all banks Bad loans 28.1127 0.0001 6 162 
Loans to firms  Bad loans firms 35.4145 0.0000 6 162 
Loans to households Bad loans hous. 3.3777 0.7602 6 162 
Total loans - BCCs Bad loans BCC 17.3104 0.0082 6 162 
Note. Block exogeneity Wald Test. 
 
